We study the task of verifiable delegation of computation on encrypted data. We improve previous definitions in order to tolerate adversaries that learn whether or not clients accept the result of a delegated computation. In this strong model, we construct a scheme for arbitrary computations and highly efficient schemes for delegation of various classes of functions, such as linear combinations, high-degree univariate polynomials, and multivariate quadratic polynomials. Notably, the latter class includes many useful statistics. Using our solution, a client can store a large encrypted dataset on a server, query statistics over this data, and receive encrypted results that can be efficiently verified and decrypted.
INTRODUCTION
Can an outside party compute for us, without learning our private data? Can we efficiently check that it performed the computation correctly? These are some central questions related to the privacy and the security of cloud computing, a paradigm where businesses buy computational time from a service, rather than purchase and maintain their own resources. Both questions have a long research history.
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Computing arbitrary functions on encrypted data was a research interest recognized very early by cryptographers [42] , and it remained open until Gentry's construction of the first fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme [23] . Gentry's work revealed a new set of techniques that were immediately used for many more efficient schemes [24, 46, 25, 16, 15, 26, 14] ; today we seem to stand at the verge of having FHE schemes which can be used in practice.
Efficient verification of arbitrarily complex computations was the underlying goal of interactive proofs [3, 30] , where a powerful (e.g. super-polynomial) prover can (probabilistically) convince a weak (e.g. polynomial) verifier of the truth of statements that the verifier could not compute on its own. Research on making the verifier as efficient as possible led to the concept of probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) [2, 5, 4] , and their cryptographic applications: the arguments of Kilian [34, 35] and Micali's non-interactive CS Proofs [39] .
The application to cloud computing has rekindled attention to this area, particularly in the search for protocols where arbitrary poly-time (as opposed to superpoly-time) computations can be efficiently verified by a linear (or quasilinear) verifier, and performed by a prover without too much overhead. Starting with the work on proofs for muggles [28] , a line of research revisited and "scaled down" the PCP machinery [29, 10, 11] . Another line of work explored alternative ways of arithmetizing computations to construct efficient proofs [31, 37, 21] . Yet another approach used FHE as a tool to build efficient verification of arbitrary computations [20, 1, 17] . Several implementational efforts [18, 43, 44, 48, 41, 8, 49] show that also in this area we are on the verge of achieving practical efficiency, with the quadratic span program techniques of [21, 41] showing particular promise.
Our Contribution
Given the practical and theoretical relevance of this topic, as well as the level of maturity of the field, it is somewhat surprising that most of the research was focused on solving either one of the two main questions. There are many results about finding efficient FHE schemes, and therefore efficient computation on encrypted data, but without verification of its correctness. On the other hand, the works on verifying computation mostly focused on the case where the data is in the clear or in a restricted model for privacy -a notable exception is the construction of Goldwasser et al. [27] , based on functional encryption.
The protocols for verifiable computation (VC) in [20, 17, 1] use FHE as a tool for verifiability, and almost as a byproduct, they achieve data privacy as well, but in a restricted sense: namely, only if the client's acceptance bit is kept hidden from the server, i.e. the server is not allowed to issue verification queries. Also, in [20] only the topology of the function is revealed [7] . In [20] , a formal definition of all the properties needed by a VC scheme is given, including input privacy, but still in absence of verification queries.
This model is quite restrictive in practice, as in real life the client's acceptance bit may leak due to multiple reasons: error messages, protocol termination, recomputation, etc.
To the best of our knowledge, no definition of private and secure VC with presence of verification queries can be found in the literature. We give such definitions, provide schemes that satisfy them, and support our constructions with experimental results. Our contribution, in a list:
1. An upgrade to the definition in [20] that allows verification queries by the adversary, and an extension of this definition that models adaptive security and function privacy. This is the strongest possible model in which we can define security. 2. A protocol based on FHE for arbitrary computations. 3. Constructions for specific families of functions to compute: multivariate quadratic polynomials, univariate polynomials of high degree, linear combinations -all on encrypted data (details on Table 1 ). Using our schemes a client can outsource the storage of large, privacy-sensitive, data sets (e.g. location, medical, genomic data) on a server, and get statistics or distance measures (computed by the server) on them, with guarantees of correctness of the computation and privacy of the data. 4. A key technical contribution is the introduction of a homomorphic hashing technique that allowed us to obtain improvements of more than four orders of magnitude compared to a naive approach. 5. Implementations and performance numbers of our schemes for practical security parameters. Now, we discuss our contribution more in detail.
Our Generic Protocol. Our protocol assumes the existence of an FHE scheme and a not-necessarily private, but secure VC scheme, e.g. [21] . The basic idea is to encrypt the data x with the FHE scheme, and to run the VC scheme on the function Eval FHE (f ), instead of f , and on input Enc FHE (x) instead of x. This technique prevents the server from using the client as a decryption oracle for the FHE, since the acceptance bit is determined before decryption, just according to the correctness of the evaluation of Eval FHE (f ).
Ad-Hoc Protocols. We focus on the problem where a client stores a large data set x = (x0, . . . , xt) on a server and later asks the server to compute functions f over x. Our solutions work in the amortized model in which the client spends a single pre-processing phase whose cost is as running f (x), and later amortizes this one-time cost over several function evaluations. Moreover, our protocols work also in the so-called streaming model: clients can process and outsource single data items xi in a separate fashion. This is desirable for storing applications, since it enables clients to work with a very small memory, independent of the size of the (possibly huge) data set. As an example, think of a set of weak devices that read the temperature in given locations, and daily send the data to a server to store for later analysis (e.g. calculate the mean temperature in a year).
We focus on the case where the data sets consist of elements in a finite field Fp, and the outsourced functions can be: (1) quadratic multi-variate polynomials, (2) univariate polynomials of large degree, and (3) linear combinations. In the full version [19] we also show a scheme for linear combinations over Z 2 k , omitted here for lack of space. Multi-Variate Quadratic Polynomials. We constructed a VC scheme in the case the client stores several encrypted data sets at the server, and then asks it to compute a quadratic polynomial f on any of the outsourced sets. In our solution, after a single pre-processing for every f , the client can verify results in constant time. Moreover, our scheme achieves input and output privacy.
In terms of applications, this scheme allows to compute several statistics (average, variance, covariance, RMS, linear regression, correlation coefficient, and many more) on remotely stored data sets in a private and verifiable manner. We also consider the application in which a client stores a large matrix X on the server, and then asks to compute a distance measure (e.g. Euclidean distance) between a given vector y and any row of X. We propose a variant of our scheme that is function private for a restricted class of quadratic polynomials (privacy holds only for the coefficients of the linear terms). Yet, since the above application fits such restriction, we give a solution in which both X and y are private.
We are not aware of any other existing solution for privately evaluating multivariate quadratic polynomials, except by instantiating our paradigm with existing tools [15, 6] . Even compared to these solutions, our experiments show that our ad-hoc protocol improves significantly: for instance, in our scheme the computation of the variance function at the server is more than 10 4 times faster! If we consider cloud computing, in which clients pay for the server's CPU cycles, such improvement leads to worthwhile savings. Polynomials of High Degree. We also constructed a VC scheme for a setting which is complementary to the one above. Namely, we think of x as the coefficients of a univariate polynomial Px(z) = t j=0 xiz i of degree t. With our protocol the client stores the large polynomial Enc(Px) at the server, and then asks it to compute Enc(Px(z)) on many different points z (provided in the clear). Here, after the single preprocessing to outsource Px, the client can verify all the computations in constant time. Moreover, our scheme is function private as Px is encrypted.
We note that the task of evaluating univariate polynomials of large degree was earlier considered in [9] . However, in that protocol, when the polynomial is encrypted, the client's acceptance bit depends on the decrypted value, which creates the opportunity for a verification query attack. Papa-manthou et al. [40] also propose a scheme for outsourcing polynomials of large degree, and suggest the use of FHE to achieve privacy. However, this work too suffers the same verification query attack as in [9] . In contrast, our solution (which builds on [9] in a slightly different way) enjoys security in the stronger model where verification queries are allowed. In terms of applications, we discuss how this solution can be used to outsource the Discrete Fourier Transform computation on encrypted vectors. Linear Combinations. Finally, we considered the task of outsourcing linear combinations. For this we constructed a very clean and efficient solution which provides both input and function privacy, but has no efficient verification. However, the client can work with a very short memory in the streaming model. We note that a solution with efficient verification (achieving both input and function privacy) can be obtained by using our variant scheme for quadratic polynomials. Compared to the latter, the advantage of our dedicated scheme is efficiency: we achieve verifiability by using information-theoretic techniques that do not require expensive, cryptographic computations (e.g. over bilinear groups).
We note that a protocol for the evaluation of linear combinations over encrypted data has been recently proposed by Libert et al. [36] , using additively homomorphic encryption and structure-preserving linearly homomorphic signatures. However, their protocol is restrictive, since the linear combinations have to reside in a very small range in order for the client to retrieve the correct result: the client's decryption consists in solving discrete log, by which the exponents must be small. In contrast, our solutions for linear combinations can support large domains and provide function privacy. An Overview of Our Techniques. To design our protocols we follow the blueprint of our generic scheme and we develop additional techniques that provide significant efficiency improvements. Our basic idea is to encrypt the data with a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme (for privacy), and to add an authentication mechanism on top of the ciphertexts (for security). For the encryption, we chose a simplified version of the scheme by Brakerski, Gentry, and Vaikuntanathan (BGV) [15] . The server stores µ = (µ0, . . . , µt) where µi is a BGV encryption of xi. For authentication, we rely on homomorphic MACs [22] . In a nutshell, this primitive enables a client to use a secret key to authenticate a set of messages m1, . . . , mt by producing corresponding tags σ1, . . . , σt. Later, given such tags, anyone (without any secret key) can produce a tag σ that authenticates m = f (m1, . . . , mt) as the output of f on the previously authenticated inputs. Interestingly, verification can be performed without knowing the original messages, and recently proposed schemes [6] allow to verify more efficiently than running f . The generic idea for our schemes is to generate a MAC σi for every ciphertext µi, and then use the homomorphic property of the MAC to authenticate the BGV homomorphic evaluation. While this idea may work for appropriate choices of the MAC scheme (e.g. [6] ), we note that BGV ciphertexts consist of several components over a field Fq: in detail, if f : F t p → Fp is the desired function, the BGV evaluation circuit is a functionf :
q . We improve this situation using our key technical contribution: homomorphic hash functions Hκ that allow to compress a BGV ciphertext into a single Fqcomponent, while preserving the homomorphic properties, i.e. f (Hκ(µ1), . . . , Hκ(µt)) = Hκ(f (µ1, . . . , µt)). By applying a MAC on top of the hashed ciphertexts, we save at least a factor of 3n in all operations (e.g. input outsourcing, computation, verification). Considering that for security reasons (and technical details discussed later) n can be as large as 5000, applying the homomorphic hash leads to schemes that are up to four orders of magnitude faster. Compare the last two columns of Table 2 for the concrete example of computing the variance of 1000 items.
Without
Ours Naive Privacy [6] Table 2 : Costs for variance (t = 1000, sec = 80bit).
Experiments. We implemented the above solutions, and tested their practical performances. Remarkably, all our protocols run considerably fast. See section 6 for details. An interesting point is that the cost (in terms of CPU time) of adding privacy to verifiability is relatively small. As an example, for 80bit security, scheme in section 4.1: on the server side, the total execution time of any operation, is between 1.1 and 2.2 times the execution time for authentication operations only (i.e. excluding encryptions, FHE evaluations, etc. from the total cost), depending on the particular function. The highest privacy cost (defined as: total execution time over authentication time, as above), 2.9, occurs in one-time operations: encrypting and authenticating the data when loading it into the server. Finally, our verification algorithm has a privacy cost of 1.9×, due to decryption of the result. Compare the first two columns of Table 2 for a concrete example, and see Table 3 for more details. Notice that our timing for authentication only is comparable with the timing of [6] (adapted with a secure pairing).
Finally, we point out that, even if minimal, the privacy overhead can be mitigated by using the batching technique of BGV: for 80bit (resp. 128 bit) security we could encrypt 165 (resp. 275) 32bit plaintext items in a single ciphertext. This means the amortized cost (per plaintext item) of our scheme is actually better than [6] . NOTE: For lack of space, further discussion on related work, a full presentation of our generic protocol, proofs and more detailed numbers on our experiments appear only in the full version of this work [19] .
PROBLEM DEFINITION
We work in the amortized model of [20] where the client runs a one-time expensive phase to outsource the function f to the server (this phase can cost as much as the computation of f ). Later the client queries the server on (an encrypted form of) input x and receives back (an encryption of) the value f (x) and a proof of its correctness: this phase should be efficient for the client (ideally linear in |x|+|f (x)|).
In [20] the authors give a definition that includes both security (i.e. the client only accepts correct outputs) and privacy (i.e. the client's input x is semantically hidden to the server) but does not allow verification queries. In this section we upgrade the definition by adding verification queries to it. Moreover, we introduce the concept of adaptive security.
A verifiable computation scheme VC = (KeyGen, ProbGen, Compute, Verify) consists of the following algorithms: KeyGen(f, λ) → (P K, SK): Based on the security parameter λ, the randomized key generation algorithm generates a public key (that encodes the target function f ) which is used by the server to compute f . It also computes a matching secret key, kept private by the client. ProbGenSK (x) → (σx, τx): The problem generation algorithm uses the secret key SK to encode the input x as a public value σx that is given to the server to compute with, and a secret value τx which is kept private by the client. Compute P K (σx) → σy: Using the client's public key and the encoded input, the server computes an encoded version of the function's output y = f (x). Verify SK (τx, σy) → (acc, y): Using the secret key SK and the secret τx, the verification algorithm converts the server's output into a bit acc and a string y. If acc = 1 we say the client accepts y = f (x), if acc = 0 we say the client rejects. We now recall the main properties defined in [20] for a verifiable computation scheme: correctness, privacy, and oursourceability, but we define them in the presence of verification queries by the adversary. Next, we introduce function privacy, and adaptive security.
The intuition for correctness is that if both parties are honest, then the client accepts. More formally:
For the other notions, we need to define the following oracles.
• PProbGen(x) calls ProbGenSK (x) to obtain (σx, τx) and returns only σx.
• PVerify(τ, σ) returns acc if and only if Verify SK (τ, σ) = (acc, y). In other words, PVerify is the public acceptance/rejection bit which results from a verification query.
When we write A PVerify we mean that A is allowed to query PVerify(τ, ·) where τ can be the secret encoding of any of the queries made in PProbGen, or also τ b in the case of the privacy experiments. Input privacy is defined based on a typical indistinguishability argument that guarantees that no information about the inputs is leaked. Input privacy, of course, immediately yields output privacy.
Intuitively, a verifiable computation scheme is private when the public outputs of the problem generation algorithm ProbGen over two different inputs are indistinguishable. More formally, consider the following experiment:
Experiment Exp
Definition 2 (Privacy). A verifiable computation scheme VC is private for a function f , if for any adversary A running in probabilistic polynomial time,
Function privacy is the requirement that the public key P K, sampled via (P K, SK) ← KeyGen(f, λ), does not leak information on the encoded function f , even after a polynomial amount of runs of ProbGenSK on adversarially chosen inputs. More formally, we define function privacy based on an indistinguishability experiment as follows.
Experiment Exp
Definition 3 (Function Privacy). A verifiable computation scheme VC is function private, if for any adversary A running in probabilistic polynomial time,
The next property of a verifiable computation scheme is that the time to encode the input and verify the output must be smaller than the time to compute the function from scratch.
Definition 4 (Outsourceability). A VC can be outsourced if it allows efficient generation and efficient verification. This implies that for any x and any σy, the time required for ProbGenSK (x) plus the time required for Verify(σy) is o(T ), where T is the time required to compute f (x).
We now introduce the notion of adaptive security for a verifiable computation scheme. Intuitively, an adaptively secure scheme is a scheme that is secure even if the adversary chooses f after having seen many "encodings" σx for adaptively-chosen values x. At first sight, this property is non-trivial to achieve, since not every scheme allows σx to be computed before choosing f (in particular schemes based on FE such as [27] ). This observation leads us to first define a refined class of schemes, for which adaptivity is not ruled out by this restriction, and then proceed with the actual definition of adaptivity.
Definition 5 (Split Scheme). Let VC = (KeyGen, ProbGen, Compute, Verify) be a verifiable computation scheme. We say that VC is a split scheme if the following conditions hold:
• There exist PPT algorithms KeyGen
Notice that for a split scheme one can generate valid values σx for any function f to be delegated before knowing f , since σx is independent of f . This can be done by running (P KE, SKE) ← KeyGen E (λ), and setting σx ← ProbGen E SK E (x) before knowing f . The validity of this encoding applies for all keys (P K, SK) = (P KE, P KV , SKE, SKV ) where (P KV , SKV ) ← KeyGen V (f, λ) for any f . We can now describe the experiment that is used to define adaptive security for split schemes.
PVerify (P K, x1, σ1, . . . , x , σ ); (â cc,ŷ) ← Verify SK (τi,σy); Ifâ cc = 1 andŷ = f (xi), output '1', else '0'. Definition 6 (Adaptive Security). A split scheme VC is adaptively secure, if for any adversary A running in probabilistic polynomial time,
TOOLS
We now describe the tools used for our efficient VC schemes. Namely, an adapted version of the BGV homomorphic encryption scheme, a new notion and realizations of homomorphic hash functions, and amortized closed-form efficient pseudorandom functions.
Our schemes use a bilinear group generator G(1 λ ) whose output is bgpp = (q, G1, G2, GT , e, g, h), where G1, G2 and GT are groups of prime order, g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2 are two generators, and e : G1 ×G2 is a non-degenerate bilinear map.
The BGV Homomorphic Encryption
We now describe a stripped down version of FHE scheme by Brakerski, Gentry, and Vaikuntanathan [15] that we need for our construction. The version below is only somewhat homomorphic, and resembles the less recent scheme by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [16] . Also, since we need to evaluate only polynomials of degree at most two, our description does not need KeySwitch or ModulusSwitch. For any two ciphertexts a0 + a1Y + a2Y 2 and b0 + b1Y + b2Y 2 , addition is performed as: (a0 + a1Y + a2Y 2 ) + (b0 + b1Y + b2Y
2 ) = a0 + b0 + (a1 + b1)Y + (a2 + b2)Y 2 , and if a2 = 0 = b2 multiplication is performed as: (a0 +a1Y )(b0 + b1Y ) = a0b0 + (a1b0 + b1a0)Y + a1b1Y
2 . Notice we are interested only in multiplication of ciphertexts of level 1. Finally, the algorithm defines the following distributions: DZn,σ: the discrete Gaussian with parameter σ: it is the random variable over Z n obtained from sampling x ∈ R n with probability e −π· x 2 /σ 2 and then rounding at the nearest lattice point. Again, we refer to [16] for the specific choice of σ. 
, the message m is parsed as an element in Rq with infinity norm bounded by p/2, and the randomness r is parsed as r = (u, v, w) ∈ R 3 q . The output is c = c0
The output is then t mod p, which is interpreted as an element in Rp.
Lemma 1 ([16] , Lemma 4; and [16] , Theorem 2). For D = 1, 2, the public-key encryption scheme (BGV.ParamGen, BGV.KeyGen, BGV.Enc, BGV.Dec), specified above, is semantically secure under the PLWE assumption, and it allows the computation of any polynomial f of degree D such that
Batching. A nice capability of the BGV encryption scheme, which will be used extensively in our implementations, is the ability to encrypt many "small" plaintexts (e.g. integers modulo a 32-bit prime) into the same ciphertext: each small plaintext will then reside in its dedicated "slot" in the ciphertext. This feature was firstly introduced by Smart and Vercauteren [47] , and we refer to [15, 47] for more details.
Homomorphic Hash Functions
We now introduce the notion of homomorphic hash functions and we propose two realizations that will be used throughout the paper. Informally, a family of keyed homomorphic hash functions H with domain X and range Y consists of a tuple of algorithms (H.KeyGen, H, H.Eval) such that:
• H.KeyGen generates the description of a function HK , • H computes the function, • H.Eval allows to compute over Y. In our case we are interested in computations of arithmetic circuits, and thus H.Eval allows to compute additions and multiplications over Y.
In the following we propose a homomorphic hash whose key feature is that it allows to "compress" a BGV ciphertext µ ∈ Rq[Y ] into a single entry ν ∈ Z/qZ in such a way that H is a ring homomorphism, hence H.Eval(f, (H(µ1), . . . , H(µt)) = H(f (µ1, . . . , µt)). Turning our attention to security, we show that this first construction is universal one-way. Next, we will show a variant of this construction that maps into bilinear groups and can be proven collision-resistant. at β ∈ Z/qZ. More explicitly, H α,β = ev β • evα. H.Eval(fg, ν1, ν2): on input two values ν1, ν2 ∈ Z/qZ and an operation fg which is addition + or multiplication ×, compute fg(ν1, ν2).
Theorem 2. The family of functions H defined above is homomorphic and universal one-way, i.e., for all µ = µ :
which is negligible for an appropriate choice of q.
A Collision-Resistant Homomorphic Hash. Notice that the function H α,β is secure only if the key (α, β) is kept secret and the function is used only one time (otherwise information on α and β is leaked). Below, we show how to obtain a slightly different version of H α,β which can be proven collision-resistant at the price of being "somewhat" homomorphic -the homomorphic property holds only for degree-2 functions. Moreover, in this construction we restrict to the case in which q is a prime. Let bgpp = (q, G1, G2, GT , e, g, h) be some bilinear group parameters as described before, and let Rq[Y ] be as in BGV.
The 
, and include them in K. Output K and κ = (α, β). 
Note thatĤ can be computed in two different ways (the first one being computationally more efficient): (1) by using the secret key κ, or (2) by using the values in the public key K. H.Eval(fg, ν1, ν2) We show how to compute degree-2 functions on the outputs ofĤ in a homomorphic way. Intuitively speaking, we want to compute degree-2 polynomials f over Fq "in the exponent". To this end we rely on that the bilinear groups are isomorphic to Fq and simulate additions via the group operation and multiplications by using the bilinear pairing. More precisely, given (T1, U1), (T2, U2) (resp.T1,T2 ∈ GT ):
• Addition (in the exponent) is performed via (componentwise) group operation, i.e., (T ← T1 · T2, U ← U1 · U2) (resp.T ←T1 ·T2).
• Multiplication by a constant c ∈ Fq is performed as (T c , U c ) (resp.T c ).
• Multiplication of two values, is performed with the use of the bilinear pairing:T ← e(T1, U2) ∈ GT .
In the following theorem we show that the functionĤ described above is homomorphic, and it is collision-resistant under the -BDHI assumption which we recall below. [12] ). Let G be a bilinear group generator, and let bgpp = (q, G1, G2, GT , e, g, h)
Definition 7 ( -BDHI Assumption
← Fq be chosen uniformly at random. We say that the -BDHI assumption holds for G if for every PPT adversary A and any = poly(λ) the probability
Theorem 3. The functionĤ described above is homomorphic. Furthermore, if the (n + 1)-BDHI assumption holds for G, thenĤ is collision-resistant, i.e., for (K, κ)
Amortized closed-form Efficient PRFs
Here we recall the notion of pseudorandom functions with amortized closed-form efficiency [6] which extend closedform-efficient PRFs [9] .
A PRF consists of two algorithms (F.KG, F) such that the key generation F.KG takes as input the security parameter 1 λ and outputs a secret key K and some public parameters pp that specify domain X and range R of the function, and the function FK (x) takes input x ∈ X and uses the secret key K to compute a value R ∈ R. As usual, a PRF must satisfy the pseudorandomness property. Namely, we say that (F.KG, F) is secure if for every PPT adversary A we have that:
where (λ) is negligible, (K, pp) $ ← F.KG(1 λ ), and Φ : X → R is a random function.
For any PRF (F.KG, F) amortized closed-form efficiency is defined as follows.
Definition 8 (Amortized Closed-Form Efficiency [6]).
Consider a computation Comp that takes as input n random values R1, . . . , Rn ∈ R and a vector of m arbitrary values z = (z1, . . . , zm), and assume that the computation of Comp(R1, . . . , Rn, z1, . . . , zm) requires time t(n, m).
Let L = (L1, . . . , Ln) be arbitrary values in the domain X of F such that each can be interpreted as Li = (∆, τi). We say that a PRF (F.KG, F) satisfies amortized closed-form efficiency for (Comp, L) if there exist algorithms CFEval 
Comp,∆ (K, ω) is o(t).
An Example. Below we show a realization of amortized closed-form efficient PRFs based on the decision linear assumption. The scheme is obtained by adapting the one of [6] to work with asymmetric bilinear groups. This function will be crucial to achieve efficiency for our schemes for quadratic multi-variate polynomials.
Let f : F t q → Fq be a degree-2 arithmetic circuit, and without loss of generality, parse
for some ηi,j, η k ∈ Fq. We definef : (G1 × G2) t → GT as the compilation of f on group elements as:
Below, we describe the PRF with amortized closed-form efficiency for Comp(R1, S1, . . . , Rt, St, f ) =f (R1, S1, . . . , Rt, St): F.KG(1 λ ). Let bgpp be some bilinear group parameters, where g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2 are generators. Choose two seeds K1, K2 for a family of PRFs F K 1,2 : {0, 1} * → F 2 q , and output K = (K1, K2). The parameters define F with domain X = {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * and range R = G1 × G2. FK (∆, τ ). First, generate values (u, v)←F K 1 (τ ) and (a, b)← F K 2 (∆), and then output (R, S) = (g ua+vb , h ua+vb ).
• For i = 1 to t, compute (ui, vi)←F K 1 (τi), and interpret (ui, vi) as a linear form ρi that maps (z1, z2) to ρi(zi, z2) = ui · z1 + vi · z2.
• Next, run ρ←f (ρ1, . . . , ρt), i.e. compute a (possibly quadratic) form ρ such that for all z1, z2 ∈ Fq , z2) , . . . , ρt(z1, z2)).
• Finally, output ω f = ρ. CFEval on ∆ (K, ω f ). Parse K = (K1, K2) as a secret key and ω f = ρ as in the previous algorithm. The online evaluation algorithm generates (a, b)←F K 2 (∆), computes w ← ρ(a, b), and outputs W = e (g, h) w . The function above is secure under the decision linear assumption in asymmetric bilinear groups, recalled below.
Definition 9 (Decision Linear [13] ). Let G be a bilinear group generator, and let bgpp
. We define the advantage of an adversary A in solving the decision linear problem as
We say that the decision linear assumption holds for G if for every PPT algorithm A, Adv
Theorem 4. If the Decision Linear assumption holds for G, and F is a family of pseudorandom functions, then the function F described above is a pseudorandom function with amortized closed-form efficiency for Comp =f .
The proof of theorem 4 follows the one of [6] , theorem 2.
AD-HOC PROTOCOLS 4.1 Multi-Variate Quadratic Polynomials
In this section we propose an efficient VC scheme for the case of multi-variate polynomials of degree 2. The basic idea of the construction is to apply the homomorphic MAC scheme of [6] to the BGV homomorphic encryption, where (in this section) q is choosen to be prime. Such homomorphic MAC indeed allows to authenticate degree-2 arithmetic computations over Fq and achieves amortized efficient verification, i.e., after a pre-computation phase whose cost is the same as running f , every output of f can be verified in constant time. However, a straightforward application of the scheme [6] on top of BGV ciphertexts would require to: (1) authenticate each of the 2n Fq-components of a BGV ciphertext, and (2) authenticate the BGV evaluation circuit f :
In contrast, we significantly improve over this approach in two main ways. First, we apply our collision-resistant homomorphic hash functionĤ which allows to compress a BGV ciphertext into a pair of group elements (T, U ), yet it is a ring homomorphism for Rq [Y ] . Second, we modify the homomorphic MAC scheme of [6] so that it can authenticate group elements (instead of Fq values). Combining these two ideas allows us to avoid the O(n) blow-up (see section 6 for a concrete comparison).
Our scheme VC quad is specified as follows:
• Run BGV.ParamGen(λ) to get the description of the parameters for the BGV encryption scheme; run (pk, dk) • Run bgpp $ ← G(1 λ ) to generate the description of asymmetric bilinear groups bgpp = (q, G1, G2, GT , e, g, h), where G1, G2 and GT are groups of the same prime order q, g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2 are two generators, and e : G1 × G2 is a non-degenerate bilinear map.
• Choose a random member of the hash function familŷ
KeyGen. For the convenience of our scheme we do not use the public key ofĤ.
• Choose a random value a $ ← Fq, and run (K, pp)
In particular, FK is supposed to be computationally indistinguishable from a function that outputs (R, S) ∈ G1 × G2 such that DLogg(R) = DLog h (S) is uniform over Fq (i.e., e(R, h) = e(g, S)).
• Compute a concise verification information for f by using the offline closed-form efficient algorithm of F, i.e., ω f ←CFEval
• Output the secret key SK = (pk, dk, κ, a, K, ω f ), and the public evaluation key P K = (pk, pp, f ). ProbGenSK ( x = (x1, . . . , xt)) → σx, τx:
• Choose an arbitrary string ∆ ∈ {0, 1} λ as an identifier for the input vector x.
• For i = 1 to t: first run µi $ ← BGV.Enc pk (xi) to obtain a BGV ciphertext µi ∈ R 2 q , and compute its hash value (Ti, Ui)←Ĥκ(µi).
, and set σi = (Ti, Ui, Xi, Yi, Λi = 1) ∈ (G1 × G2) 2 ×GT .
• Output σx = (∆, µ1, σ1, . . . , µt, σt), and τx = ⊥. Note that ProbGen can work in the streaming model in which every input item xi can be processed separately. Compute P K (σx) → σy: Let σx = (∆, µ1, σ1, . . . , µt, σt). First, run µ←BGV.Eval pk (f, µ1, . . . , µt) to homomorphically evaluate f over the ciphertexts (µi). Next, homomorphically evaluate f over the authentication tags (σ1, . . . , σt)). To do so, proceed gate-by-gate over f as described below.
. Multiplication by constant. If fg = × and one of the two inputs, say σ (2) , is a constant c ∈ Fq:
). Note that after a multiplication, it is not necessary to keep U and Y , as since (for honestly computed tags) T = U and X = Y . We keep them only for ease of description. Output σy = (∆, µ, σ) where σ is the authentication tag obtained after evaluating the last gate of f . Verify SK (σy = (∆, µ, σ), τx) → (acc, x ):
• First, computeν ←Ĥκ(µ).
• Next, run the online closed-form efficient algorithm of F on ∆, to compute W ←CFEval on ∆ (K, ω f ).
• Finally, if deg(f ) = 2, check the following equations: e(X, h) a . If all equations are satisfied set acc = 1 (accept). Otherwise, set acc = 0 (reject).
• If acc = 1, then set x ← BV.Dec dk (µ). Otherwise set x = ⊥. Finally, return (acc, x ).
Theorem 5. If F is a pseudorandom function,Ĥ is a collision-resistant homomorphic hash function and BGV is a semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme, then VC quad is correct, adaptively secure and input private.
A Variant with Function Privacy. In this section we show that the previous scheme can be modified in order to achieve function privacy. Precisely, if we see the polynomial f : F t p → Fp as an arithmetic circuit, we can hide all the constants c occurring in multiplication-by-constant gates that take inputs of degree 1.
To obtain this construction, the scheme VC quad is modified into VC * quad as follows. Let f : F t p → Fp be a degree-2 arithmetic circuit. For every gate fg in f which is a multiplication by a constant c ∈ Fp, compute γ $ ← BGV.Enc pk (c), νc←Hκ(γ) and (Tc, Uc)←ĤK (γ). Then we define the function fpri : F t q → Fq as the same as f except that every multiplication by a constant c is replaced by a multiplication by the corresponding νc ∈ Fq computed as described above. f pub : F t q → Fq is the same as f except that every multiplication by a constant c is replaced by the corresponding (Tc, Uc) computed as above.
In VC * quad , KeyGen(f, λ) algorithm proceeds as before except that the value ω f is computed from fpri, i.e., ω f ← CFEval of τ (K, fpri), and EK contains f pub instead of f . In Compute P K (σx) the difference is that we slightly modify GateEval for multiplication-by-constant gates as follows:
, and recall that the constant c ∈ Fp is (publicly) encoded as (Tc, Uc) ∈ G1 × G2. We compute σ = (T, U, X, Y, Λ) as:
Theorem 6. Let F be the class of arithmetic circuits in which multiplication by constants occur only for inputs of degree 1. If F is a pseudorandom function,Ĥ is a collisionresistant homomorphic hash function and BGV is a semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme, then VC * quad is correct, adaptively secure, input private and function private with respect to F.
Computing Polynomials of Large Degree
We now look at the simpler task of delegation of univariate polynomials of large degree t, evaluated on values x ∈ Fp that do not need to be private.
We still use BGV [15] for q prime, but without using its full power: we only need its additive homomorphic property.
We then apply the technique of [9] on the hashing H α,β (γi), where γi is the BGV encryption of gi, and g(x) = t i=0 gi ·x i is the function to compute. Again, acceptance or rejection by the client depends only on the correct execution of the computation over the ciphertexts. No useful decryption query is performed. In detail, we assume that, as in [9] , the client and the server agreed on a group G of prime order q in which the discrete logarithm problem is hard, and on a generator g for G.
Before the specifications of the scheme, we shall make a final observation: due to the noise growth of the BGV scheme summarized in lemma 1 (for D = 1), in order to achieve correctness of the result to be decoded by the client, we need q to be larger than 2 · p · x t · σ · n 1.5 , where x is the evaluation point of the scheme. In the worst case, x = p, but we prefer to separate x and p, to state a more general result, that can fit better for applications in which x is smaller than p.
The scheme VC poly is specified as follows: KeyGen(g0, . . . , gt, λ) → (P K, SK):
• Specify a group (G, ·) of order q and a generator g.
• Sample a uniform MAC key c ← Fq, k0, k ∈ Fq,
• Set σx = x, and τx = x. Compute P K (σx = x) → σy:
• Compute the element X in Fq such that:
and compute a ← BV.Dec dk (γ).
Theorem 7. The scheme VC poly is correct, adaptively secure, and function private.
Computing Linear Combinations
In this section we give a specialized construction for a particular setting. Namely, we are interested in getting an input private and function private split scheme that is not necessarily outsourceable, but that works in the streaming model. Our scheme is focused on the delegation of the computation of secret linear functions on encrypted data. Again, we use BGV, but this time we require its somewhat homomorphic property for polynomials of degree D = 2 (see lemma 1 for the parameter choice), and do not require q be prime. The scheme VC LC is specified as follows. KeyGen(g = g0, . . . gt, λ) → (P K, SK):
• Run BGV.ParamGen(λ), (pk, dk) ← BGV.KeyGen().
• Sample a uniform MAC key c $ ← Rq, a key k for PRF, α $ ← Rq, β $ ← Z/qZ, and compute ri ← PRF k (i).
• Compute γi ← BGV.Enc pk (gi), Ti ← c · H α,β (γi) + ri, • Set P K = (pk, γ0, T0, . . . , γt, Tt), SK = (pk, dk, c, k, α, β).
ProbGenSK (x = x0, . . . , xt) → σx, τx: for i = 0, . . . , t
• If σx, τx are not defined: initialize σx as the zero vector in R t+1 q
, and τx ← 0 ∈ Z/qZ. • Compute µi ← BGV.Enc pk (xi).
• Compute ri ← PRF k (i), as in the keygen algorithm.
• Set the i + 1th entry of σx as µi.
• Update τx by adding ri · H α,β (µi) to its previous value (i.e. τx+ = ri · H α,β (µi)). Compute P K (σx = µ0, . . . , µt) → σy:
• Set σy = γ, τ . Verify SK (τx, σy = γ, τ ) → (acc, y ): If H α,β (τ ) = c · H α,β (γ) + τx: reject. Otherwise: accept, and compute y ← BGV.Dec dk (γ).
Theorem 8. The scheme VC LC is correct, adaptively secure, function private, input private.
Communication Complexity. If the linear combination to compute were sparse, the client could improve the communication complexity of the protocol by sending only the encryptions of the non-zero inputs (and the indices they correspond to). In this case, however, the client reveals which indices are zero (but nothing more).
APPLICATIONS
Statistics. Consider the problem in which a client stores several large data-sets x1, . . . , xN on a server, and wants to compute a collection of statistics on the outsourced data in a private and verifiable way. By using our scheme for multi-variate quadratic polynomials of section 4.1, we can provide efficient solutions for the computation of several statistical functions, such as average, variance, standard deviation, RMS, covariance, linear regression, Pearson's and uncentered correlation coefficient. In appendix A we show how these statistics can be decomposed in simpler non-rational functions that can be supported by our scheme. Distance and Correlation Measures. Consider the problem in which a client stores a large matrix X ∈ F L×N p on a server, and then wants to compute the Euclidean distance between a given vector y ∈ F N p and each row of the matrix. Namely, on input y from the client, the server computes a vector D = (D1, . . . , DL) where every entry
2 is the (square of the) Euclidean distance 1 between y and the i-th row of X. For security, we are interested in a solution that guarantees both integrity and privacy, i.e., results are efficiently verifiable by the clients without having to store the matrix X, and the server does not learn any information about X or the queried vector y.
To achieve a solution for this application we can employ the function-private scheme VC * quad for degree-2 polynomials (by explicitly relying on its split version) as follows:
• First, the client generates the secret key for the inputencoding (P KE, SKE)
• In a pre-processing phase, given the matrix X, the client computes σ x,i $ ← ProbGen(SKE, Xi) for all the rows of X. Precisely, we can use batching to encode s rows in the same σ x,i . The cost of this phase, which is performed only once, is O(L · N ). 1 For simplicity, we assume that the final square root can be directly computed by the client.
• Given the vector y, the client defines the function fy(z1, . . . , zN ) = N j=1 (zj − yj) 2 , and runs (EK fy , SK fy ) $ ← KeyGen V (fy, λ, P KE, SKE). Note that fy is an admissible function for VC * quad as it is of degree-2 and all the constants derived from the yj's multiply degree-1 terms. Moreover, notice that the client can compactly send fy to the server by sendingĤ(yi). This phase costs O(N ).
• The server computes σD i ←Compute(EKE, EK fy , σ x,i ) for every (packed) row of the encrypted matrix, and returns (σD 1 , . . . , σD L ) to the client.
• Finally, the client obtains the verified result by running the verification algorithm on each σD i . The cost of verifying each entry is O(1) which sums up to O(L). To summarize, after the pre computation to outsource the matrix, the work performed by the client to send y and verify the result is O(N + L), which outperforms the cost of running this computation, which is O(L · N ). Note also that the pre computation cost can be amortized when asking many queries y for the same matrix X. For privacy note that by input privacy and function privacy the server does not learn information about the matrix X or the vector y.
While the protocol above is described for the Euclidean distance, it is easy to see that the same approach works also for other degree-2 functions with the same properties. Namely, for any f ( y, Xi) such that by fixing y, f is of degree-2 and multiplications by yi involve only degree-1 monomials. For example, this property holds for the covariance (or correlation coefficients) between y and each row of X.
Discrete Fourier Transform. The discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of a t-dimensional vector f is defined as the vector y = (f (α1), . . . , f (αt)) where f is interpreted as the coefficients vector of a polynomial of degree (t − 1), and the αi's are the t roots of unity. It is easy to see that by using our scheme for univariate polynomials of section 4.2, a client can store encrypted vectors on a server and then request the DFT transform of these vectors in a private and verifiable way. In particular, note that the delegation and verification cost is optimal: O(t) (i.e., O(1) for every entry of y).
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To give the reader a glance at the practical applicability of our procedures, we implemented the schemes in sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, and reported the cost of each procedure.
Setup
Hardware and Software. Our timings were performed on a 2011 MacBook Pro (Intel Core i5-2415M, 2 hyperthreaded cores at 2.30GHz, 8GB RAM at 1.333GHz), on Ubuntu (linux kernel 3.11, SMP, x86 64). Our implementations are single-threaded. We used (a tweaked version of) HElib [32] for the BGV scheme [15] , NTL [45] for operations over Rq and Rq[Y ], and PBC [38] for group operations. Due to recent discrete log attacks [33] on symmetric pairings, we used asymmetric Type-3 pairings (using Type-F in PBC) which, however, do not perform greatly on PBC. We are confident that using a different library can significantly improve some of our results.
Input. Our schemes are targeted at the encryption of a database that can be thought of as a big table. Each row of the table represents an input, and each column represents an attribute. For example, consider a sensor that reads the number of bicyles, cars, and trucks driving through Paper Street each day. This sensor could generate a database where each row corresponds to a day, and each column to a type of vehicle (so that cell i, j corresponds to the number of vehicles of type j on day i).
The schemes we implemented all use the BGV encryption scheme [15] , which, as pointed out in section 3.1 has the nice feature batching. Therefore, for the computation of the same function for each attribute (e.g. the average amount of bicycles, cars, trucks, etc, going through Paper Street in March), it is natural to encrypt each entire row of the database into a single ciphertext, encoding each data set element into a different slot.
Parameters selection. In our implementations we covered 80bit and 128bit security, and we required the length of each data set item to be at most 32bit. These choices lead to the following parameters (s denotes the number of slots): Polynomials (Section 4.2 and 4.1): For 80bit (respectively 128bit) security, we chose log q = 173 (log q = 272), n = 5418 (n = 8820), s = 165 (s = 275). Linear Combinations (Section 4.3): For 80bit (respectively 128bit) security, we chose log q = 123 (log q = 173), n = 4050 (n = 6370), s = 125 (s = 196).
Timings
For lack of space we only present amortized, or per-attribute costs. For total costs, multiply the columns by the appropriate number of slots (s, in "Parameters Selection" above). Costs associated with procedures followed by " * " are obtained using exponentiations with precomputation. We introduce the concept of PCost (a shorthand for "privacy cost") of a process, defined as the ratio of the total execution time of the process over the time taken by the process to compute authentication operations (i.e. excluding privacy operations such as encryption, FHE evaluation, hashing, etc). PCost can therefore be seen as a measure for the cost for bringing privacy to each operation of a VC scheme.
In the following, by "Amortized" cost, we mean the perattribute cost, which equals the "Raw" (or total) cost of an operation divided by the number of attributes, according to the above parameters choice. Moreover, costs associated with procedures followed by " * " are obtained using exponentiations with precomputation.
Multi-Variate Quadratic Polynomials

Timing (ms)
Amortized Cost PCost Table 3 : Costs for the scheme in section 4.1.
On the Impact of Homomorphic Hashing. Our experiments showed the improvement obtained by applying our technique of homomorphic hashing. We compared our adhoc protocols with some of the best possible instantiations of our generic scheme and observed a remarkable speedup. For instance, for the case of multivariate quadratic polynomials, one may use BGV to encrypt and then use a homomorphic • f 1 , f 2 , and f 3 denote the cost of the corresponding function (as defined in appendix A). Notice that f 3 does not scale linearly with the database size (a constant cost of one multiplication dominates for small databases).
• KeyGen 1 , KeyGen 2 , and KeyGen 3 denote the cost of KeyGen for the corresponding function. Here there is a constant term (BGV.ParamGen) and a linear term that depends on the cost of the function.
• ProbGen, and Verify denote the cost of the corresponding function. Dashed lines depict costs obtained using precomputation. Notice that the cost of Verify is constant. Table 5 : Costs for the scheme in section 4.3.
MAC [6] to authenticate each of the 2n ciphertext entries. However, this would further require to authenticate bigger circuits: for example, one has to validate at least 4(n log n) multiplications and 5n additions over Z/qZ for a single multiplication of two ciphertexts (estimate obtained with FFT; a trivial method leads to 4n 2 multiplications and 5n additions). In contrast, by applying our homomorphic hash we can use the same original circuit and the additional cost of computing the hash becomes negligible. As a concrete example, computing the variance of a database without homomorphic hashing is 13615 times slower than our scheme of Section 4.1 (80bit security), as shown in Table 2. was accomplished under Agreement Number W911NF-06-3-0001. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the author(s) and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, the U.S. Government, the U.K. Ministry of Defence or the U.K. Government. The U.S. and U.K. Governments are authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Government purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation hereon. The research of Valerio Pastro was supported by NSF Grant No.1017660.
